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Abstract
This study investigates the issue of self-selection of stakeholders into participation
and collaboration in policy-relevant experiments. We document and test the impli-
cations of self-selection in the context of randomised policy experiment we conducted
in primary schools in the UK. The main questions we ask are (1) is there evidence
of selection on key observable characteristics likely to matter for the outcome of
interest and (2) does selection matter for the estimates of treatment effects. The
experimental work consists in testing the effects of an intervention aimed at en-
couraging children to make more healthy choices at lunch. We recruited schools
through local authorities and randomised schools across two incentive treatments
and a control group. We document the selection taking place both at the level of
local authorities and at the school level. Overall we find mild evidence of selection
on key observables such as obesity levels and socio-economic characteristics. We
find evidence of selection along indicators of involvement in healthy lifestyle pro-
grammes at the school level, but the magnitude is small. Moreover, We do not find
significant differences in the treatment effects of the experiment between variables
which, albeit to a mild degree, are correlated with selection into the experiment. To
our knowledge, this is the first study providing direct evidence on the magnitude of
self-selection in field experiments.
JEL Classification: C93, I18, J13
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1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a booming increase in the popularity of field experiments in
economics and the social sciences (Holt, 2005). The main driving factors behind this in-
creasing popularity are, on the one hand, the quest for identification of causal mechanisms
– which is easier to achieve when researchers are directly involved in manipulating the
economic environment of interest – and, on the other hand, a quest to remain close to
reality as opposed to studying subjects in an isolated laboratory context. There is now a
stronghold of researchers advocating the case for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in
social policy (Burtless, 1995, Duflo and Kremer, 2005).
This study is interested specifically in a fundamental methodological issue associated
with field experimental research: the selection of field collaborators into the experiment.
Conducting field experiments usually requires finding collaborators such as employers,
policymakers, schools, etc. who are prepared to collaborate with researchers and provide
the necessary support for data collection. As List (2011) puts, the support of a key
person prepared to stand behind the research project is often critical: “Have a champion
within the organization – the higher up the better. Making the experiment a “we” project
instead of an “us versus them” pursuit as early as possible is critical.” Surprisingly
perhaps, field experimental papers devote very little attention to the issue of “selection
into the experiment”. As an illustration, we provide in Appendix A a brief overview of
the information provided in field experimental studies published over the last five years
in the top 5 journals and in the American Economic Journal Applied. We focus on the
fields of policy evaluation, personnel economics and development economics, which have
all experienced a significant increase in the popularity of field experimental research.1
In most cases we know little or nothing about how the collaborators were selected and
approached, and the experimental sample is not compared to the broader population of
interest. One notable exception is a recent paper by Fryer (2011).
Researchers are well aware of the limitations that result from restricting experiments
to subjects who have opted in. The main limitation is a possible selection bias and a
lack of external validity. Obviously there is always some form of selection taking place.
An experiment will, for example, take place within a given geographical area and at a
particular point in time. This initial selection is often for practical reasons. Researchers
located in California will find it more practical to conduct a field experiment in California
than across the entire United States or across several countries. It is probably even de-
sirable that the experiment can be conducted with sufficient oversight by the researchers.
1We searched these journals systematically for the keywords ‘field’ and ‘experiment’.
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It does nevertheless raise issues of generalizability, insofar as it restricts the sample to
a population with certain characteristics (e.g. people living in California at a particular
time).
How important is selection in field experimental research? Harrison and List (2004)
acknowledge in their review paper that we know very little about the implications of self-
selection for field experimental research. Seven years later Ludwig et al. (2011) point out
that this is still an open question that has not been answered.
We study the issue of self-selection in participation in a randomised controlled ex-
periment conducted in a highly policy relevant domain: children’s diet. The goal of the
experiment is to test the effectiveness of various incentive schemes to encourage children
to eat fruit and vegetables at lunch. To conduct this experiment, we sought the collabo-
ration of primary schools in the UK. We recruited them through local authorities, which
play an overarching and coordinating role in the UK. Rather than picking a set of local
authorities in an arbitrary manner, we approached all local authorities in the country at
the same time and in the same manner (via e-mail) and asked whether they would be
interested in collaborating with us. If they responded positively, we asked them to bring
us in contact with at least five local schools. the rationale for doing this is to understand
how overarching bodies themselves select potential participants for randomised controlled
experiments. Since many social experiments are piloted by government bodies, this type
of selection is likely to be highly relevant in the design of many social experiments. The
randomisation does eventually take place at the school level and within local authorities,
so local authorities should expect some schools to be treated and some schools to be
part of a control group. The schools are the ones that are ultimately directly involved
in the experiment and data collection. We contacted the schools suggested by the local
authorities, briefed them about the project and they then decided whether to participate
or not. Thus, we have potential selection operating at different levels: self-selection of
local authorities, selection of schools by local authorities and self-selection of schools into
the experiment.
We document how selection operates at these differentlevels along observable charac-
teristics of the population under consideration – characteristics that we would expect could
matter in the decision to participate, such as obesity rates and socio-economic indicators.
We consider a wide range of variables that could a priori be relevant and see whether
they are correlated with selection or not. Then we investigate whether the variables that
are correlated with selection are also correlated with treatment effects estimated in the
RCT. Of course we can only do this exercise with observables, and cannot provide a full
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account of the selection bias that could take place. It is clear that we cannot control for
some key variables (such as personality characteristics of the people involved) that may
introduce a selection bias in the RCT as well. Moreover, it is clear that if selection was
only driven by observables, it would be straightforward to correct for it. The point here is
to get a sense of how much selection takes place along characteristics that could a priori
be relevant and are observable, which should in principle give a sense of the importance
of the full selection problem.
We propose that the documentation exercise we perform here should be a minimum
standard for field experimental research in social sciences. It seems obvious that collecting
information on key variables at the early stages of an experiment can provide useful
insights into the possible magnitude of selection and is helpful to see how the results can
be generalized to the population at large, which is the overriding aim of pilot studies and
policy-relevant experiments. At the moment, researchers tend to be very conservative and
modest in their claims regarding the external validity of their results. We believe that a
proper documentation of the selection process would help us drawing more general lessons
from field randomised controlled experiments.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that documents systematically the process of
selection into a policy-related experiment. We have the advantage of having access to a
range of indicators on the broad population of interest (all local authorities in England and
all primary schools within each local authority) and study systematically the correlation
between these indicators and selection into collaborating with us.
Our findings can be summarised as follows. First, we find that local authorities who
self-select tend to be larger and richer, and have less favourable characteristics in terms
of the outcome of interest (e.g. lower rates of fruit and vegetable consumption). But
the selection is mild and almost disappears when it comes to actual participation. We
also find no evidence that selection operates according to pre-trends. We also find little
evidence of selection at the school level, except for one dimension, which is that the
schools suggested by the local authorities to conduct the experiment are more likely to
be involved in programmes promoting healthy lifestyles (as evaluated by an independent
official body). Second, we do not find any significant correlations between the treatment
effects of the experiment and the variables which, albeit to a mild degree, are correlated
with selection into the experiment.
The remain of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related work.
Section 3 presents the experimental design and the context of our study. In Section 4, we
look at the determinants of selection at the local authority and school levels. In Section
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5, we examine to what extent the treatment effects estimated in the RCT are correlated
with the variables determining selection. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Related work
There is surprisingly little systematic work studying selection into field experiments. The
work most related to ours is the work on selection issues arising in policy evaluation studies
(Heckman and Vytlacil (2006)). This work derives theoretical implications regarding the
sign of the selection bias one should expect in these interventions. The general prediction
is that one should expect a positive selection bias: those who self-select in the intervention
are likely to be those who expect to benefit most from the intervention.
Malani (2008) develops a model of self-selection into medical randomised controlled
trials where participants self-select into the experiment based on a prior belief about
the effectiveness of the treatment. He assumes that patients have a choice between an
old treatment and participating in a randomised controlled trial (RCT) involving a new
treatment. As the probability of being assigned to the treatment group in the RCT
increases, less optimistic patients are willing to participate in the RCT. If the probability
is lower than 1 (which will always be the case by definition in a RCT), only the most
optimistic will be willing to experiment and we will obtain a positive selection bias. The
main difference with our model is that people cannot access the new treatment out of
the RCT. While this may be the case in medical trials, it is usually not the case for
experiments conducted in the social sciences. This is why those who are optimistic may
opt out and prefer to implement the intervention (or a similar intervention) themselves.
In a related paper (Belot and James, 2013), we extend Malani’s model to the context
of randomised social and policy experiments. A key difference is that in a social or policy
experiment, the decision to participate to a randomized controlled trial does not only
entail a choice between participating or not doing anything. A third alternative could
be to conduct a similar intervention without taking part and without running the risk
of being in the control group. This alternative is likely to be attractive for the most
optimistic - those who believe the intervention may be effective. They may prefer to
opt out from the experiment because there is a chance they will end up in the control
group and not receive the benefits from the intervention. In our context, the idea of using
incentives in a health-related context is not new. In fact there is a growing market for
stickers and other rewards to encourage children to eat healthily. Thus, it is plausible
that schools would have wanted to implement an incentive scheme independently of being
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approached by us. But of course if they participate and end up in the control group, we
will explicitly ask them not to implement any incentive scheme over the course of the
study. This example is, we believe, quite representative for many randomised controlled
experiments.Thus, two types of selection (positive and negative) could take place at the
same time. On the one hand, we have a group of ”optimists” (who expect the treatment
to be successful) who could opt out and introduce a negative selection bias. On the other
hand, we have a group of ”pessimists” (who do not expect the treatment to be successful),
who could opt out as well if they are not fully compensated for the experimentation and
implementation costs. Their decision not to participate will introduce a positive selection
bias. Because both types of selection could take place at the same time, it is not possible
to sign the direction of the selection bias.
To our knowledge, there is only one other study, by Allcott and Mullainathan (2011),
who focus on the issue of external validity and partner selection bias in randomized
controlled experiments (RCTs) in the social sciences. They provide evidence of the limited
external validity of RCTs with unique data from 14 nearly-identical energy conservation
field experiments conducted at different sites in the US. These RCTs are run by a company
called OPOWER and the treatment in these experiments is to mail Home Energy Reports
(HERs) to residential electricity consumers, with the goal of causing them to use less
energy. The fact that the same experiment was conducted at 14 different sites allows
them to gauge the extent to which treatment effects vary across sites and thereby provide
evidence of the biases that may arise by conducting an experiment in one geographical
area alone. The estimated average treatment effects vary by a factor of 2.4, and cost
effectiveness by a factor of 4.2. They show that observable population characteristics
explain very little of this variation. Relying on a treatment effect estimated in one specific
area could therefore lead to very biased estimates of the average treatment effect.
They also discuss various mechanisms of partner selection bias in randomized con-
trolled trials (RCTs) – both positive and negative. There could be a positive bias because
implementing randomized trials requires managerial ability and operational efficacy and
partners who run the most effective programmes may also be the best equipped to eval-
uate these programme. This form of positive partner selection bias has been called “gold
plating” (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007). Another form of positive partner se-
lection bias results from the fact that those running effective programmes are more keen
to show they work than those who fear they are running ineffective ones, and prefer to
remain “ignorant” (Pritchett 2002). Negative partner selection bias could arise if those
who are running the most effective treatments have already treated the parts of their
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population that have the largest treatment effects (”diminishing returns bias”).
Using data from 939 electricity utilities in the U.S. with more than 10,000 residential
customers, they show that those who partner with OPOWER have observable character-
istics that are negatively correlated with treatment effects – that is, there is evidence of
negative selection. They attribute this negative selection bias to a “diminishing return
bias”, those with larger treatment effects have already treated their population. They
provide further evidence of partner selection bias in micro-finance field experiments and
show that micro-financial institutions (MFIs) that have partnered to carry out randomized
trials with three large academic initiatives - the Jameel Poverty Action Lab, Innovations
for Poverty Action, and the Financial Access Initiative - differ from the average MFI on
characteristics that might be associated with treatment effects, including for-profit status,
size, experience, share of borrowers that are female, and average loan size.
Only one other paper examines selection in a field experiment setting, Gautier and
Van Der Klaauw (2012). Although this does not involve partner selection it shows in
a unique and natural setting the role that self-selection can play in leading to biased
results in field (and lab) experiments. They are able to examine the effect of selection in
a gift exchange game by exploiting a promotion in all hotels of a chain in Belgium and
the Netherlands that allowed customers to pay what they wished for a one-night stay.
They compare the behaviour of two groups of participants, an involuntary group who had
booked before the annoncement of the promotion and were not aware of it at the time of
booking with a group who booked after the promotion was announced - a voluntary group.
The self-selected voluntary group paid less and did not respond to an exogenous change
in the posted price unlike the involuntary group. These results suggest that experiments
aiming at testing for pro-social behaviour are underestimating its presence in particular
where participants can self-select into the experiment.
To summarise, there are few studies documenting the issue of self selection in ran-
domised controlled experiments in social sciences and, in theory, the sign of the selection
bias could go either way.
3 Context and Experimental Design
Obesity and diet are high on the policy agenda. The broad question of our study (which we
used to approach the local public authorities), is whether providing short-term incentives
can successfully encourage children to make healthier nutritional choices and develop
healthier habits. We contacted all 150 local authorities in the United Kingdom on Friday
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2 July 2010 and Monday 5 July 2010 (we randomly selected half of the sample to be sent on
each day). The e-mail (see appendix) described who we are and the aim of the project. We
specifically indicated that we were interested in comparing the effectiveness of incentive
schemes to increase the consumption of fruit and vegetables at lunch in schools and that
the interventions were designed to target children who have been found to respond little to
health interventions, such as children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds and boys.
These specific observables (consumption of fruit and vegetables, children from poorer
socio-economic backgrounds) vary across local authorities and we are able to document
precisely how selection takes place based on the observables we mentioned in the letter.
The timing of this initial contact coincided with the First National Child Obesity
Week2 taking place in the UK, from July 5th until July 10th. School meals and chil-
dren’s diet were also widely discussed in the media. On 30 June 2010, the Secretary of
Health Andrew Lansley criticized the Jamie Oliver School Food revolution, referring to
the campaign led by the British chef Jamie Oliver aimed at improving parental cooking
skills across the country (the criticism was targeted at the patronizing approach of the
campaign). The public criticism triggered a strong reaction in the media and the public.
Lansley apologised to Oliver later in October 2010. At the same time, the climate regard-
ing public funding was relatively grim. Large public funding cuts were expected across
the whole country.
The Experimental Treatments
The experiment is fully documented in Belot, James and Nolen (2013). We will only
briefly describe the key elements of the experiment here. The goal of the experiment is to
study the effects of providing incentives on choosing and eating healthy items using two
different interventions: a piece-rate scheme and competition scheme. In both schemes,
pupils were given a sticker for choosing or bringing in a healthy item at lunch. Then,
at the end of the week (Friday afternoon), each student had the opportunity to win a
larger prize. In the piece-rate scheme, pupils were eligible for an additional reward if they
collected four stickers or more during the week. In the competition scheme, students were
assigned to random groups of four, and the pupil with the most stickers in each group
won an additional reward.
Our initial e-mail mentioned that we intended to test the effectiveness of incentive
schemes, without being specific. We also mentioned being particularly interested in study-
ing how boys would respond in comparison to girls, and how pupils from disadvantaged
2http://www.mendcentral.org/ncow
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backgrounds would respond in comparison to pupils from richer backgrounds. These spe-
cific interests came as a follow-up from a previous study we conducted in the UK (Belot
and James, 2011).
We now turn to the documentation of the selection in the context of our study.
4 Determinants of Selection
4.1 Selection at the level of local authorities
We first study the determinants of selection at the level of local authorities. We differen-
tiate between response to the e-mail (positive or negative), interest (positive response),
collaboration (provision of names of 5 schools in the area), participation (schools in areas
decide to take part in the intervention). Out of the 150 local authorities contacted, 63
responded within a month. 33 indicated a positive interest in collaborating and 18 asked
for a meeting. 28 agreed to collaborate, and 22 of them have effectively engaged in the
first step of collaboration (we asked them to suggest the names of 5 comparable schools
in the area). 12 LEAs finally participated in the actual experiment.
4.1.1 Contemporary indicators
We first consider socio-economic and health indicators which are most associated at the
local authority level for the year 2008, which were the most recent available indicators in
June 2010. The next section discusses the role of pre-intervention trends.
We have information on the average weekly household income, the percentage of free
school meals (school meals are part of a means-tested programme and around 17% of
children receive free school meals in the UK), the number of schools in the area, and
a number of variables capturing overweight children and obesity rates, as well as adult
health habits (and in particular, the percentage of people eating the recommended five
portions of fruit and vegetables per day).
Regarding the initial response first (Table 1 Panel A) – a response can be either
negative (0) or positive (1). Each of our definitions of selection are estimated using a
probit regression, and the estimates in each of the tables are presented as marginal effects.
We find that areas with a larger number of schools were more likely to respond, and we
find some evidence (although the coefficients are not always significant) that authorities
with a higher income and a lower consumption of fruit and vegetables were more likely to
do so. Turning to the probability of a positive interested response (Table 1 panel B) (and
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assuming that no response within a month is a negative response), we find that larger
LEAs and LEAs with richer households are more likely to be interested. We find that
those with a lower consumption of fruit and vegetables are also more likely to respond,
as well as those more confronted with a child obesity problem.
We include additional health indicators to gauge whether the selection is driven by
the general state of health in the local area or whether it operates mainly through the
indicators and variables that are specifically targeted in the study (children’s obesity and
diet). Of course these general indicators are correlated with the more specific ones, but
the question is whether these general indicators alone are good predictors of interest. In
columns (5) and (6) we substitute indicators for smoking and binge drinking with the
indicator of fruit and vegetable consumption. We find that these indicators are poor
predictors of interest in collaboration – the coefficients are close to zero and rather pre-
cisely estimated. This suggests that the interest is not reflecting a general poor state of
health in the area but is rather reflecting specific weaknesses with respect to the indicators
specifically targeted in the study.
Examining those who collaborate with us, Table 2 panel A, we find less systematic
differences in terms of observable characteristics than for the initial interest. The number
of schools, and income remain significant. Obesity rates are not systematically different.
We also fail to find systematic differences according to the percentage of free school meal
children. There remains a systematic difference, albeit to a lesser extent, in terms of fruit
and vegetable consumption, which is perhaps the most obvious outcome of interest in our
study. Table 2 Panel B shows little selection along the lines of actual participation.
Tables B1-B4 examine determinants that, although not directly associated, could de-
termine whether they respond and express an interest in the intervention. We include
the level of education at the age groups we would target in the intervention – key stage
1 (taken at aged 6) and key stage 2 (taken at aged 11). Those with better key stage 2
scores are more likely to respond, however, this is not the case for expressing a positive
interest. Given the political timing in which we contacted the local authorities there was a
huge amount of uncertainty surrounding funding. We then consider three types of public
spending measures. Per pupil spending for the current year, the change in spending, and
the spending at the local authority level, none of which determine participation at any
level. Finally, we consider the gender of the initial two contacts, the CEO of the local
authority and the director of children’s services, and the most likely contact to whom our
original letter would have been passed on to, the healthy schools contact. The gender of
these contacts does not determine response, interest or collaboration.
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Summarizing the results, we find some evidence of selection taking place, but it is
mild, certainly when it comes to the actual collaboration.
4.1.2 Pre-trends
We now consider the role of pre-trends in health and education indicators. The question is
whether the areas that responded and engaged in collaboration with us were on different
trends than others. For example, are these areas confronted with a deterioration in these
health indicators or, on the contrary, are they the ones on a positive trend, which could
indicate that they are effectively engaged in improving children’s diet and obesity already?
Table 3 panel A controls for trends in obesity and overweight rates. We find no
evidence of any selection based on those trends. Of course it could be that both types are
more likely to self-select: more than one standard deviation up or one than more standard
deviation down in comparison to 2006 level. Panel B controls for trend in education, again
we find no evidence of self-selection.
4.1.3 Non monotonicity
As discussed earlier, a priori there could be positive and negative selection taking place
at the same time, that is, both the optimists and the pessimists could choose to opt out.
To the extent that these beliefs are correlated with observables in a monotonic way, then
one way to allow for positive and negative selection at the same time is to allow for non
monotonicity in the relationship between observables and the probability of opting in.
Table 4 replaces the continuous measures of the key variables (fruit and vegetable,
obesity, and income) with dummies representing the mid-point and an upper value for
that variable. These show that those who self-select are those with the greatest problems
to solve. The areas with the highest levels of fruit and vegetable consumption are the
least likely to express an interest or collaborate. The areas with the top third of fruit and
vegetable consumption are between 32 and 29 percentage points more likely to express
and interest, around 25 percentage points to collaborate, however there are no systematic
differences in the propensity to collaborate or participate.
4.2 Selection of Schools
We turn to the selection of schools that were recruited into the intervention. As mentioned
previously, we asked each local authority to provide the names of 5 schools that would be
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willing to participate in the experiment. As we mentioned earlier, the rationale for doing
this is to understand how overarching bodies themselves select potential participants for
randomised controlled experiments.
We asked for 5 representative schools from the local area, as comparable as possible
in terms of socio-economic status and engagement in health interventions, without fur-
ther requirements. We have quite detailed information about the schools in each local
authority. We have information on free school meal participation, school size and a range
of school spending variables. In addition to that, we also have information from school
inspections conducted by the official inspection body Ofsted3. These inspections are sum-
marized in reports that provide measures of how well the school operates or performs
in various dimensions. There is a general measure of school performance, which assigns
scores from 1 to 4, where a score of 1 is outstanding, 2 is good, 3 is satisfactory, and 4
is inadequate. There is also a measure that provides information on how well the school
performs at “getting its pupils to adopt healthy lifestyles”, which is obviously directly rel-
evant in this context. Schools are rated according to a similar scoring rule (from 1 to 4)
as the general measure. This measure is the closest indicator we have that captures the
involvement of schools in promoting healthy lifestyles.
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis of selection. The dependent variable in
each case is binary represented by a one if the school was selected to participate by
the local authority and zero otherwise. We find a negative selection with regards to an
overall indicator of school performance (Ofsted score 1). But we find a positive selection
with regard to the health promotion measure. The schools that are selected by the local
authority are more likely to be those with an “outstanding” score in promoting healthy
lifestyles.
5 Treatment Effects and Selection Characteristics
In this section we examine the treatment effect of the experiment and examine whether this
varies according to the characteristics that have been shown to, albeit mildly, determine
selection into the experiment. In particular we focus on the immediate effect of the
intervention and focus on how the treatment effect differs according to the ofsted health
score and the level of fruit and vegetable consumption.
3www.ofsted.gov.uk/
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In particular we estimate the following:
Mean(Outcome)isz = β0 + βzInterventionz + βcompComps + βpiecePieceRates
+ βz,compComps × Interventionz
+ βz,piecePieceRates × Interventionz + αi + uist
(1)
Where the two outcomes we consider are whether the fruit or vegetable was chosen and
whether at least some of it was eaten (tried). The mean is the number of items chosen (or
tried) during the week by the number of days the student was present. The intervention
is a dummy indicating 1 for weeks 2 to 5 and 0 for the baseline week (week 1) and post
intervention week (week 6). Comp and PieceRate are dummy variables indicating whether
school s is part of the competition or treatment group, and the unobserved error term is
αi + uist
Table 6 presents the estimates from the experiment4. Panel A presents the estimates
for choice for the whole sample. Column 1 presents the baseline estimates for all pupils.
Column 2 shows the effect for those schools not deemed outstanding along the lines
of the ofsted health score described in the previous section and column 3 presents the
estimates for those which are outstanding. Column 4 shows the p-value of a test of
the difference between these two groups of schools. We find no statistically significant
difference between the treatment effects for these two groups. Columns 5, 6 and 7 repeat
this exercise splitting the sample between those schools in local authorities with below
(column 5) and above (column 6) the median of fruit and vegetable consumption at the
local authority level for the adult population. The point estimates are larger for both
piece rate and competition treatments for the below median fruit and vegetable group,
however, they are both imprecisely estimated and are not significantly different from each
other.
Panel B considers another group of interest - those who did not choose fruit or veg-
etable 100% of the time during the baseline week. This group has some margin to improve.
There are positive effects for both treatments, albeit imprecisely estimated for the piece
rate treatment. We do not find significant differences between the ofsted health groups,
nor for above and below the median of fruit and vegetable consumption. Panel C and D
4A full account of the treatment effects of the experiment is documented in Belot, James and Nolen
(2013). In particular the main estimates examine how the effects vary week by week, this is not our
primary interest here and as such we just examine the effect using a dummy variable for the 4 weeks of
the intervention period.
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present the treatment effects for trying a fruit or vegetable. Again we find no significant
differences between the treatment effects for these groups.
6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper discusses and provides evidence of selection of field experimental partners in
a policy relevant experiment. We provide evidence based on a specific policy experiment,
which consists of providing incentives to children to eat fruit and vegetables at lunch. All
potential partners were approached at the same time. We have access to a range of rele-
vant observable measures likely to be correlated with prior beliefs about the effectiveness
of the intervention and with the ability to conduct the intervention. We observe mild se-
lection along observable characteristics. Local authorities interested in collaborating tend
to be larger and richer, and have lower levels of fruit and vegetable consumption. Next
to that, the schools suggested by local authorities and ultimately participating to the
experiment tend to be those who are already outstanding in promoting healthy lifestyles.
Local authorities are more likely to involve schools that are already engaged in promot-
ing healthy lifestyles, but who do not score highly on an overall evaluation measure of
management.
In conclusion, the schools that are part of the experimental sample do not show strong
systematic differences along observable socio-economic characteristics, but they are those
who have possibly experimented before and are more likely to be located in areas where
there is a problem to solve.
Field experimental research has experienced a boom in popularity over the last decade,
particularly in the fields of policy evaluation, development economics and personnel eco-
nomics. Surprisingly, there has not been much attention devoted to the documentation of
partner selection. We would argue that a careful documentation of the selection process
on observable characteristics would significantly improve the external validation of the
results.
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Table 1: Main Determinants of response to initial e-mail, interest and response
Panel A: Response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.142 0.147* 0.141 0.140 0.124 0.123
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087)
Contacted by J James 0.076 0.073 0.075 0.072 0.085 0.085
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)
Income/100 0.084* 0.082 0.084* 0.085* 0.016 0.007
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.038) (0.038)
% FSM 0.741 0.129 0.660 0.344 0.759 0.843
(0.570) (0.727) (0.782) (0.808) (0.591) (0.525)
Number of schools/100 0.080** 0.080** 0.080** 0.081** 0.071* 0.070*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Fruit and Veg -0.028* -0.026* -0.028* -0.027*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
% Overweight & Obese Reception -0.000
(0.019)
% Obese Reception 0.044
(0.036)
% Overweight & Obese Year 6 0.003
(0.021)
% Obese Year 6 0.016
(0.025)
Smoking 0.004
(0.014)
Binge Drinking -0.001
(0.012)
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
R squared 0.0656 0.0731 0.0657 0.0676 0.0482 0.0479
Panel B: Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.066 0.070 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.052
(0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.082)
Contacted by J James 0.041 0.030 0.034 0.027 0.056 0.053
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
Income/100 0.140*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.143*** 0.057* 0.035
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.034) (0.034)
% FSM 0.568 -0.057 -0.122 -0.380 0.566 0.813*
(0.479) (0.610) (0.655) (0.717) (0.497) (0.458)
Number of schools/100 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.074** 0.069**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Fruit and Veg -0.036** -0.035** -0.033** -0.035**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
% Overweight & Obese Reception 0.017
(0.018)
% Obese Reception 0.061*
(0.033)
% Overweight & Obese Year 6 0.035*
(0.020)
% Obese Year 6 0.051**
(0.026)
Smoking 0.015
(0.012)
Binge Drinking 0.003
(0.011)
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128
R squared 0.113 0.131 0.128 0.133 0.0657 0.0565
notes:
All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: Main Determinants of response to initial e-mail, collaboration and participation
Panel A: Collaboration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.004 0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 0.000
(0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068)
Contacted by J James 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.022 0.021
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065)
Income/100 0.086** 0.083** 0.081** 0.086** 0.030 0.030
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029)
% FSM 0.425 0.055 0.092 -0.141 0.437 0.580
(0.408) (0.517) (0.563) (0.595) (0.425) (0.382)
Number of schools/100 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.063** 0.062**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Fruit and Veg -0.024* -0.024* -0.022* -0.023*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
% Overweight & Obese Reception 0.009
(0.015)
% Obese Reception 0.035
(0.026)
% Overweight & Obese Year 6 0.017
(0.016)
% Obese Year 6 0.028
(0.019)
Smoking 0.008
(0.010)
Binge Drinking 0.007
(0.009)
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
R squared 0.0748 0.0840 0.0792 0.0864 0.0460 0.0458
Panel B: Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.062 0.064* 0.058 0.061 0.060 0.064
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042)
Contacted by J James 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.012
(0.032) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Income/100 -0.029 -0.030 -0.033 -0.031 -0.029 -0.019
(0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021)
% FSM -0.402 -0.583** -0.520 -0.435 -0.448 -0.396
(0.282) (0.288) (0.354) (0.386) (0.322) (0.279)
Number of schools/100 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Fruit and Veg -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
% Overweight & Obese Reception 0.009
(0.008)
% Obese Reception 0.024*
(0.013)
% Overweight & Obese Year 6 0.007
(0.009)
% Obese Year 6 0.003
(0.011)
Smoking 0.004
(0.005)
Binge Drinking 0.007
(0.006)
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
R squared 0.159 0.185 0.150 0.144 0.148 0.160
notes:
All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Role of Pre-Trends in Obesity and Education
Panel A: Obesity Trends
Response Interest Collaboration Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contacted by J James 0.090 0.091 0.059 0.060 0.020 0.021 0.014 0.015
(0.084) (0.084) (0.076) (0.076) (0.064) (0.064) (0.035) (0.035)
Income/100 0.076 0.073 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.081** 0.079** -0.034 -0.032
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048) (0.039) (0.040) (0.024) (0.024)
% FSM 0.823 0.636 0.739 0.561 0.514 0.370 -0.269 -0.180
(0.588) (0.737) (0.511) (0.644) (0.440) (0.538) (0.333) (0.381)
Number of schools/100 0.093** 0.094** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.022 0.022
(0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014)
Fruit and Veg -0.025 -0.025 -0.037** -0.037** -0.024** -0.025** -0.002 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Obesity 2008-Obesity 2006 (Reception) -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.000
(0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.009)
Obesity 2008-Obesity 2006 (y6) -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 0.003
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.008)
Observations 146 146 129 129 146 146 146 146
R squared 0.0508 0.0517 0.0991 0.100 0.0702 0.0711 0.111 0.113
Panel B: Education Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contacted by J James 0.092 0.089 0.034 0.030 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.016
(0.085) (0.084) (0.077) (0.077) (0.063) (0.063) (0.032) (0.032)
Income/100 0.078 0.074 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.081** 0.085** -0.032 -0.034
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.040) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022)
% FSM 0.454 0.313 -0.405 -0.252 -0.250 -0.108 -0.256 -0.309
(0.843) (0.855) (0.733) (0.755) (0.613) (0.612) (0.367) (0.384)
Number of schools/100 0.094** 0.092** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.026* 0.024*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013)
% Obese Reception 0.040 0.040 0.030 0.032 0.020 0.019 0.025 0.026
(0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017)
% Obese Year 6 -0.001 -0.000 0.037 0.036 0.019 0.021 -0.006 -0.007
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012)
KS1 Score 2009-KS1 Score 2007 -0.155 -0.052 0.055 -0.085
(0.226) (0.199) (0.165) (0.090)
Fruit and Veg -0.022 -0.022 -0.032** -0.033** -0.022* -0.022* -0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
KS2 Score 2009-KS2 Score 2007 0.031 -0.206 -0.154 -0.038
(0.243) (0.228) (0.184) (0.101)
Observations 146 146 129 129 146 146 146 146
R squared 0.0592 0.0569 0.131 0.136 0.0870 0.0912 0.155 0.145
notes: All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 4: Splines of key variables
Response Interest Collaboration Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contacted on Friday 0.125 0.120 0.039 0.044 -0.009 -0.008 0.017 0.011
(0.087) (0.088) (0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.065) (0.020) (0.015)
Contacted by J James 0.099 0.116 0.069 0.074 0.023 0.034 -0.001 0.003
(0.085) (0.086) (0.077) (0.078) (0.063) (0.063) (0.010) (0.007)
% FSM 1.137 0.210 0.476 0.009 0.305 -0.021 -0.076 -0.120
(0.728) (0.651) (0.633) (0.554) (0.513) (0.447) (0.108) (0.129)
Number of schools/100 0.072* 0.084** 0.083** 0.086** 0.066** 0.071** 0.000 0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.004) (0.003)
Income/100 -0.003 0.018 0.082 0.077 0.053 0.055 -0.049 -0.035
(0.064) (0.065) (0.056) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047) (0.037) (0.033)
Income Mid 0.180 0.133 0.162 0.104 0.107 0.067 0.049 0.030
(0.128) (0.131) (0.129) (0.130) (0.108) (0.106) (0.049) (0.036)
Income Upper 0.228 0.106 0.205 0.110 0.170 0.095 0.616** 0.508
(0.216) (0.227) (0.215) (0.216) (0.189) (0.182) (0.283) (0.316)
Fruit & Veg Mid -0.118 -0.084 -0.099 -0.069 -0.086 -0.070 0.018 0.023
(0.120) (0.122) (0.100) (0.106) (0.079) (0.081) (0.026) (0.029)
Fruit & Veg Upper -0.210 -0.174 -0.323*** -0.287** -0.266*** -0.246*** -0.003 0.001
(0.148) (0.149) (0.110) (0.116) (0.092) (0.094) (0.019) (0.015)
Obesity Mid (y6) -0.010 0.233* 0.107 -0.007
(0.117) (0.125) (0.102) (0.011)
Obesity Upper (y6) -0.084 0.158 0.093 -0.016
(0.152) (0.168) (0.135) (0.021)
Obese Mid (Reception) 0.023 0.026 0.005 -0.008
(0.116) (0.112) (0.088) (0.011)
Obese Upper (Reception) 0.236* 0.286* 0.204 0.009
(0.142) (0.157) (0.135) (0.018)
Observations 147 147 130 130 147 147 147 147
R squared 0.0678 0.0831 0.144 0.152 0.109 0.129 0.289 0.318
notes: a) All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 b) Mid refers
to above the 33rd and below (and equal to) the 66th centiles, upper refers to above the 66th percentile, the reference group is below (or equal to) the 33rd pecentile.
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Table 5: Selected Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ofsted Health Score 1 0.017** 0.020** 0.021** 0.020** 0.017** 0.018** 0.014*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Ofsted Health Score 3 and 4 0.005 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Ofsted Overall Score 1 -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.012***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Ofsted Overall Score 3 and 4 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
FSM Medium 0.012 0.010 0.029 0.029 0.025
(0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
FSM Low -0.006 -0.005 0.009 0.008 0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Total Pupils/100 0.005*** 0.004** 0.005** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Catering Staff Costs/100 0.011*** 0.009* 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Other Staff Costs -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Energy Costs 0.015** 0.013* 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Total School Income/100 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg Eng/Math Score 09/10 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1,973 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,789 1,789
R squared 0.0128 0.0292 0.0423 0.0613 0.0981 0.103 0.160
LEA Dummies No No No No No No Yes
notes: a) All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. b) Sample of schools based on paricipating local authorities. c) Ofsted Scores: 1 is outstanding, 2 is good (omitted catergory), 3
and 4 represent satisfactory and inadequate. (source: www.ofsted.gov.uk) d) FSM Band - The three broad bands used to group pupils eligi-
ble for FSM are: Low: less than 20%, Medium: 20.01-35% and High: greater than 35% (omitted catergory). This data comes from school
level expenditure per pupils tables (source: https://media.education.gov.uk/schoolsspenddata/primary.xls). e) Source of Cost (spending) variables:
https://media.education.gov.uk/schoolsspenddata/primary.xls
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Table 6: Treatment Effects and Selection Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Ofsted Health Ofsted Health P-value Below Above P-value
Not Outstanding Outstanding of diff FV Median FV Median of diff
Panel A: Choice
Comp*Intervention 0.048 0.034 0.018 0.218 0.076 0.010 0.185
(0.034) (0.046) (0.038) (0.046) (0.039)
Piece-Rate*Intervention 0.047 0.033 0.044 0.911 0.092 0.003 0.886
(0.055) (0.090) (0.068) (0.079) (0.073)
Observations 2,768 1,272 1,496 2,768 1,552 1,216 2,768
Number of pupils 626 295 331 626 351 275 626
Panel B: Less than 100% Choice in baseline week
Comp*Intervention 0.157*** 0.141** 0.103** 0.122 0.170*** 0.190* 0.607
(0.056) (0.058) (0.048) (0.052) (0.114)
Piece-Rate*Intervention 0.102 0.097 0.099 0.722 0.125 0.127 0.375
(0.074) (0.104) (0.095) (0.080) (0.139)
Observations 971 473 498 971 601 370 971
Number of pupils 203 95 108 203 121 82 203
Panel C: Try
Comp*Intervention 0.081** 0.089* 0.051 0.695 0.043 0.118 0.828
(0.039) (0.051) (0.045) (0.040) (0.081)
Piece-Rate*Intervention 0.069 0.058 0.069 0.925 0.099 0.034 0.733
(0.064) (0.085) (0.086) (0.115) (0.058)
Observations 2,679 1,194 1,485 2,679 1,459 1,220 2,679
Number of pupils 609 280 329 609 334 275 609
Panel D: Less than 100% Try in baseline week
Comp*Intervention 0.181*** 0.185*** 0.161*** 0.407 0.144*** 0.179*** 0.183
(0.037) (0.051) (0.038) (0.041) (0.059)
Piece-Rate*Intervention 0.165* 0.112 0.180 0.686 0.201 0.103 0.554
(0.093) (0.131) (0.123) (0.142) (0.091)
Observations 1,339 616 723 1,339 671 668 1,339
Number of pupils 304 146 158 304 156 148 304
notes: OLS regression results; including pupil random effects and with standard errors clustered at the school level. Additional controls:
week dummies. Dependent variable is the pupil weekly mean. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Column (5) restricts the sample to schools where the fruit and vegetable consumption at the local authority level is equal to or below
26.5% and column (6) restricts the sample to schools where the fruit and vegetable consumption is above 26.5%
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Appendix A: Survey of Top 5 field experimental pa-
pers
Policy (health and education)
Fryer, QJE (2011) Financial Incentives and Student Achievement : Evidence from
Randomized Trials
- Partner: 200 schools across three cities in the US
- Intervention: Provision of incentives to school children (on school inputs and outputs)
- Documentation on partner selection: Yes
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: Yes
Hastings and Weinstein, QJE (2008)
- Partner : Charlotte Mecklenburg Public School Distict
- Intervention: Provision of information about school outcomes to parents
- Documentation on partner selection: No
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: No
Wisdom, Downs, and Loewenstein, AEJ:Applied (2010)
- Partner: Fast Food Sandwich Chain
- Intervention: Provision of nutritional information
- Documentation of partner selection: No
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: No
Development Economics
Dupas, AEJ:Applied (2011)
- Partner: two rural districts of Western Kenya, involving 328 primary schools
- Intervention: Provision of HIV risk information to teenagers
- Documentation of partner selection: No
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: No
Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, AER (2011)
- Partner: Schools in Kenya
- Intervention: To examine the impact of tracking in schools
- Documentation of partner selection: No
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: No
Oster and Thornton, AEJ:Applied (2009)
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- Partner: Four schools in Chitwan District, Nepal
- Intervention: Test the impact of providing sanitary products of school attendance
- Documentation of partner selection: No
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: No
Personnel economics
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, QJE (2007)
- Partner: fruit picking farm
- Goal: Test the effectiveness of worker’s pay incentive scheme
- Documentation on partner selection: No
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: No
Falk, Econometrica (2007): Gift exchange in the field,
- Partner: Charitable organization
- Goal: Testing gift exchange in the field
- Documentation of partner selection: No
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: No
Fehr and and Goette, AER (2007)
- Partner: Bicycle Messenger Service
- Goal: Testing labour supply responses to transitory wage changes
- Documentation of partner selection: No
- Comparison with broader sample of the population: No
Appendix B: Additional Tables
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Table B1: Other Determinants of response to initial e-mail, Response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.147* 0.147* 0.141 0.150* 0.155* 0.164*
(0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088)
Contacted by J James 0.073 0.073 0.076 0.064 0.071 0.078
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086)
Income/100 0.073 0.044 0.045 0.079 0.087* 0.093*
(0.052) (0.055) (0.063) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
% FSM 0.406 0.409 -0.523 0.179 0.478 0.354
(0.904) (0.848) (1.611) (0.838) (0.926) (0.868)
Number of schools/100 0.080** 0.087** 0.076* 0.075* 0.073* 0.079*
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041)
% Obese Year 6 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.006 0.001
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
% Obese Reception 0.049 0.074 0.034 0.040 0.045 0.050
(0.044) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Fruit and Veg -0.026* -0.023 -0.033* -0.024 -0.031* -0.030*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Key Stage 1: Avg score 2009 0.101
(0.140)
Key Stage 2: Avg score 2009 0.232*
(0.130)
Per Pupil Spending 2010/11 0.000
(0.000)
% Per Pupil Spend increase 2010/11 1.655
(28.800)
% LA Spending Change 2010/11 1.601
(3.416)
Gender CEO 0.002
(0.104)
Gender Children Services 0.074
(0.088)
Gender Healthy Schools 0.015
(0.113)
% of Labour Councillors -0.349
(0.355)
% of Conservative Councillors -0.077
(0.297)
Labour Controlled Council -0.159
(0.123)
Conservative Controlled Council -0.035
(0.118)
Observations 145 145 145 143 145 145
R squared 0.0757 0.0892 0.0794 0.0746 0.0785 0.0810
notes:
All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B2: Other Determinants of response to initial e-mail, Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.049 0.050 0.047 0.085 0.051 0.051
(0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.083) (0.081) (0.082)
Contacted by J James 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.012 0.019 0.019
(0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Income/100 0.128** 0.121** 0.129** 0.142*** 0.132*** 0.134***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.057) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
% FSM -0.237 -0.365 -1.376 -0.447 -0.307 -0.284
(0.787) (0.722) (1.433) (0.708) (0.789) (0.742)
Number of schools/100 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.084**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
% Obese Year 6 0.037 0.032 0.035 0.040 0.031 0.036
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031)
% Obese Reception 0.041 0.052 0.030 0.033 0.036 0.037
(0.040) (0.043) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Fruit and Veg -0.033** -0.032** -0.036** -0.033** -0.035** -0.037**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Key Stage 1: Avg score 2009 0.101
(0.130)
Key Stage 2: Avg score 2009 0.122
(0.117)
Per Pupil Spending 2010/11 0.000
(0.000)
% Per Pupil Spend increase 2010/11 -6.401
(24.347)
% LA Spending Change 2010/11 -1.011
(2.998)
Gender CEO 0.151
(0.103)
Gender Children Services 0.029
(0.079)
Gender Healthy Schools -0.037
(0.109)
% of Labour Councillors 0.081
(0.317)
% of Conservative Councillors 0.180
(0.282)
Labour Controlled Council -0.023
(0.114)
Conservative Controlled Council 0.107
(0.119)
Observations 128 128 128 126 128 128
R squared 0.143 0.146 0.143 0.157 0.142 0.147
notes:
All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B3: Other Determinants of response to initial e-mail, Collaboration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.024 -0.002 0.006
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Contacted by J James 0.006 0.007 0.006 -0.002 0.005 0.010
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Income/100 0.069* 0.072* 0.071 0.084** 0.080** 0.090**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.048) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
% FSM 0.134 -0.135 -1.153 -0.178 -0.079 -0.043
(0.646) (0.603) (1.143) (0.591) (0.655) (0.616)
Number of schools/100 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.080*** 0.070** 0.070** 0.069**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
% Obese Year 6 0.026 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.018 0.022
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
% Obese Reception 0.027 0.031 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.022
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Fruit and Veg -0.022* -0.021* -0.021 -0.022* -0.024* -0.026**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Key Stage 1: Avg score 2009 0.159
(0.106)
Key Stage 2: Avg score 2009 0.085
(0.099)
Per Pupil Spending 2010/11 0.000
(0.000)
% Per Pupil Spend increase 2010/11 6.949
(19.917)
% LA Spending Change 2010/11 -1.917
(2.548)
Gender CEO 0.083
(0.086)
Gender Children Services 0.008
(0.066)
Gender Healthy Schools -0.001
(0.085)
% of Labour Councillors 0.087
(0.267)
% of Conservative Councillors 0.168
(0.233)
Labour Controlled Council -0.085
(0.082)
Conservative Controlled Council 0.030
(0.096)
Observations 145 145 145 143 145 145
R squared 0.105 0.0940 0.0973 0.0937 0.0926 0.0985
notes:
All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B4: Other Determinants of response to initial e-mail, Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.061 0.064* 0.062* 0.057 0.064* 0.064*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Contacted by J James 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.013 0.008 0.010
(0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Income/100 -0.031 -0.033 -0.032 -0.028 -0.027 -0.024
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
% FSM -0.364 -0.394 -0.919 -0.430 -0.599 -0.541*
(0.335) (0.330) (0.575) (0.308) (0.364) (0.328)
Number of schools/100 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
% Obese Year 6 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
% Obese Reception 0.029* 0.033* 0.022 0.025 0.026* 0.026*
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Fruit and Veg -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Key Stage 1: Avg score 2009 0.028
(0.044)
Key Stage 2: Avg score 2009 0.029
(0.044)
Per Pupil Spending 2010/11 0.000
(0.000)
% Per Pupil Spend increase 2010/11 10.924
(9.506)
% LA Spending Change 2010/11 -1.123
(1.074)
Gender CEO 0.005
(0.035)
Gender Children Services 0.022
(0.029)
Gender Healthy Schools -0.037
(0.050)
% of Labour Councillors 0.062
(0.108)
% of Conservative Councillors -0.043
(0.106)
Labour Controlled Council -0.005
(0.036)
Conservative Controlled Council -0.041
(0.037)
Observations 145 145 145 143 145 145
R squared 0.198 0.198 0.233 0.210 0.205 0.209
notes:
All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix C: E-mail sent to local authorities
Dear Mr xxxxxx,
We are researchers in economics at the University of Oxford and the University of
Essex and take the liberty to contact you to enquire whether you would be willing to
collaborate with us in the context of a research project on children’s diet habits.
To give a brief background, we are specifically interested in the effects of diet on
health outcomes and cognitive development (educational performance). We have recently
conducted a detailed analysis of the effects of the Jamie Oliver Feed Me Better Campaign
on educational achievements of young children and found that improving school meals did
lead to a significant improvement in Key Stage 2 educational scores and to a reduction
in absenteeism. One of the most striking findings we highlighted was the differences
across subgroups of children in how marked these improvements were: we found stronger
improvements in educational achievements for girls than boys, and we also found that it
took longer to see improvements among children from poorer socioeconomic background
than among children from more favourable socioeconomic backgrounds. This evidence is
in line with findings of other studies. This fact is obviously a serious concern for policy,
particularly in the context of reducing disparities in society.
Our ambition would be to assess the effectiveness of interventions targeted at changing
diet habits, and specifically those of children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds.
Our research expertise is specifically in the design and evaluation of policies using state-of-
the art statistical techniques. The interventions we propose are inspired by recent research
published in high standards scientific journals in economics and psychology, which suggest
that introducing temporary incentives to encourage healthy behaviour might effectively
result in long lasting changes in habits.
In a nutshell, the idea would be to conduct interventions in schools in a systematic
manner to shed light on the most effective mechanisms to trigger changes in diet habits.
We attach a brief description of our proposal to this e-mail.
Given the large interest in public policy for improving diet and health outcomes, we
were hoping that you might be interested in collaborating with us. We would be more
than happy to provide more details about what we would like to do. You can find all our
contact details in the attached proposal.
We very much look forward to hearing from you,
Thanking you very much in advance
Michele Belot and Jonathan James
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